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During the current debt crisis in Europe a number of unelected ministers and even prime-
ministers have been appointed to government to resolve the economic crisis. 
Commentators argue that such appointments hurt democracy and are unlikely to succeed. 
However, appointments of un-elected technocrats are not unique to the current economic 
crisis. Nonetheless to this day, we have very little understanding of the economic and 
political impact of unelected ministers and prime-ministers. Does it make a difference for 
representation whether ministers and governments are technocratic instead of partisan? 
With a couple of notable exceptions, the discipline lacks systematic knowledge on the 
causes and effects of unelected technocrat ministers. When are technocrats more likely to 
be appointed and how do their appointments affect the government’s policy decision and, 
in turn, effective representation of the electorate? Using a new dataset on ministers in 
eighteen economically advanced democracies, I address this question by studying 
whether critical economic events predict technocratic appointments. The findings of this 
paper shed light to the complex interdependence of pre-electoral commitments, policy 
outputs and representation in parliamentary democracies.   
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Introduction 
In the midst of the financial crisis, the Greek prime-minister George Papandreou 
reshuffled his cabinet and appointed a party heavy-weight and party leadership contender 
as his finance minister, Evangelos Venizelos. According to the Financial Times, “George 
Papandreou yielded to pressure from his fractious Socialist party after threats by deputies 
to bring the government down over a new austerity package.” (Financial Times, June 17 
2011, Greek PM gives rival finance portfolio). A year later, in June 2012 the newly 
elected prime-minister and leader of the Greek conservative party, Antonis Samaras, 
chose an economics professor and non-partisan minister as his finance minister, Ioannis 
Stournaras. Unlike Venizelos, Stournaras had no links or purchase on the party base or on 
the parliamentary group. This paper asks the following two questions: when do prime 
ministers appoint technocrat ministers- unelected ministers with policy expertise? 
Secondly, are technocrat ministers more or less able than partisan ministers to implement 
policy reforms? 
The lack of attention given by the literature to the appointments of ministers 
whose policies have critical redistributive effects, such as ministers of finance, labor and 
social affairs, is surprising. The literature has studied neither the appointments nor the 
policy effects of ministers who handle economic and social policy. Instead, it has either 
tried to explain the appointments of non-partisan ministers, defined as those who have not 
been elected to the national parliament (Neto and Strom 2006; Yong and Hazel 2011) or 
the appointments of ‘technician’ ministers, defined as those who have training in 
economic policy, irrespective of whether they are elected or not (Hallerberg and Wehner 
2013). To our knowledge, there is no literature on the policy effects of technocrats versus 
partisan ministers. 
The literature provides two main reasons for the appointment of non-partisans: the 
lack of policy expertise within the party parliamentary group (Blondel 1991; Yong and 
Hazell 2011) and the lack of trust between coalition partners – specifically between prime 
ministers and presidents in semi-presidential systems- in the cabinet (Neto and Strom 
2006). The limited pool of experts within the parliamentary group might explain why the 
ministry of finance and economics typically have a larger number of non-partisan, expert 
ministers than other ministries (Winter 1991). Nonetheless, the large majority of finance 
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and economics ministers in parliamentary democracies are partisans. Furthermore, there 
is a large variation in the appointment of non-partisan ministers across countries, across 
types of governments and across party families. What explains this variation? If non-
partisan ministers bring in the cabinet policy expertise and are trusted by coalition parties, 
why not appoint more of them?  
The most important conditioning factor for the appointment of non-partisans 
discussed in the literature is the position of the prime minister (Poguntke and Webb 2007) 
or the president (Neto and Samuels 2010) vis a vis his or her party or the legislature, 
respectively. Weak prime ministers should have a harder time appointing outside the 
parliament policy experts. This argument assumes that appointments of non-partisan 
expert ministers are politically controversial. This should be particularly true for the 
appointments of the ministers of finance, labour and social affairs, whose policies have 
important distributive and redistributive effects. On the other hand, Neto and Strom 
(2006) argue that non-partisan ministers are less controversial than partisan ministers and 
this is why they are often appointed in semi-presidential systems under conditions of 
divided government.  
Interestingly, the literature has failed to theorize ministerial appointments of non-
partisans on the basis of their expected policy effects and/or their ideological profile. The 
only exception is Blondel (1991), who briefly refers to a fundamental difference between 
partisan and non-partisan ministers. He argues that technocrats are concerned only 
marginally with the political implications of the tasks they perform…and are also more 
secure than partisans, as they can expect to return to their original professions when they 
leave the government (Blondel 1991). Building on this significant difference between 
partisan and technocrat ministers we predict that technocrat ministers, who have no 
intention of being elected, are more likely to implement politically controversial reforms 
than technocrats who have policy ambitions or than partisan ministers, who pursue a 
political career.  
Secondly and a consequence of the political costs of policy reforms for partisan 
ministers, we argue that technocrats are more likely to be appointed when the cost of 
policy reforms for partisan ministers is too high. For example, technocrat finance 
ministers are more likely to be appointed when the government must reduce debt but a 
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significant number of party members are not committed to this policy reform. Thus, we 
argue, we cannot predict the appointment of partisan or technocrat ministers unless we 
take into account, firstly the ideological placement of technocrats vis a vis the political 
party that appoints them, and secondly intra-party politics. The logic of ministerial 
appointments is likely to differ dramatically in economically liberal parties than in Social 
democratic parties, where there might be less agreement between party members 
regarding policy reforms that go against traditional policy goals. In other words, policy 
factions within the party should matter for the appointment of technocrat ministers.  
Unlike partisan ministers who are more likely to implement policies favored by 
the party base or by public opinion, non-partisan experts- defined as technocrats- have 
strong policy views in line with their professional training. The question is when does a 
prime minister appoint an expert who might diverge from the party median or who will 
completely ignore a party faction?  
Using a unique dataset, which distinguishes ministers of finance, labour and 
social affairs as partisans or technocrats, this paper allows us to test a theory of 
ministerial appointments and ministerial policy effectiveness. By doing so the paper 
contributes to the literature of economic governance by answering the following two 
questions: Are partisan ministers or technocrats better equipped to implement unpopular 
and politically costly reforms? Secondly, when and why do prime ministers appoint 
partisan ministers with limited policy expertise in critical economic portfolios and when 
and why do they appoint outside of the parliament policy experts? 
The paper innovates by showing that appointments of technocrat ministers have 
important economic consequences and are politically sensitive. Preliminary empirical 
results show that technocrat ministers of finance are associated with lower debt, lower 
economic growth, and lower social spending. The appointment of technocrat ministers is 
particularly difficult for social democratic parties, which are committed to higher 
spending. Indeed, social democratic prime ministers choose partisan over technocrat 
finance ministers unless they are faced with a major financial crisis, like the current 
financial and banking crisis.  	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Literature review 
Blondel (1988) argues that parliamentary governments that recruited at least some 
ministers from outside the parliament tend to function as well as or better than those that 
did not. Thus, chief executives concerned with the success of the policies and the 
competence of the ministers would consider appointing non-partisan/expert ministers 
who would have necessary technical skills required to implement successful policies. 
Recruitment from inside the parliament restricts the talent base and results in the 
appointment of ministers with inadequate skills (Headey 1974). The size of the pool of 
ministrables in a given country largely depends on constitutional laws and the 
professionalization of politics in a political system. The focus on a parliamentary career 
forces politicians to focus on skills that are relevant for success in politics but not 
necessary for success in good government (Yong and Hazell 2011: 15). Thus, this 
perceived gap in skills and experience lead to a search outside the traditional pool of 
ministerial candidates, for instance in the UK in mid 2000’s (Yong and Hazell 2011: 14).   
Prime ministers have multiple and at times conflicting policy and political goals 
to meet when they assign ministerial posts. Policy priorities of the government, technical 
expertise, and political experience and competence are all important factors of the 
equation. Prime ministers want to appoint ministers who effectively draft bills, 
communicate with the rest of the cabinet and the media, and who, in other words, 
contribute to the cabinet’s overall policy performance. At the same time, political 
competition within the party imposes different imperatives: which ministries should be 
under political heavyweights and political competitors? Which ministries will be 
acceptable to senior politicians? Which portfolios should be more active and which less 
active in terms of policy output (Dowding and Dumont 2009)? 
In other words, ministerial, and non-partisan appointments particularly, create 
controversy and require strategic balancing (Dowding and Dumont, 2009: 10). Under 
these conditions, the prime minister’s control over his/her party can be critical in 
ministerial appointments. For instance, Poguntke and Webb (2005) link the presence of 
non-partisan ministers with the degree of presidentialization of the parliamentary 
governments and the strength of prime ministers to act independently. Similarly, Neto 
and Samuels (2010) find that executives face strong incentives to appoint more partisan 
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ministers only when they depend on legislative confidence. In contrast, under the 
separation of powers, executives have stronger incentives to appoint non-partisans (Neto 
and Samuels, 2010: 10). Thus they find that the stronger the executive and the more 
voters have a direct role in the executive’s investiture, the higher the proportion of non-
partisan ministers in the government (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010: 14).  
Similarly, Neto and Strom (2006) argue that semi-presidential systems should 
have a higher number of non-partisans compared to pure parliamentary systems. 
However, the authors argue that this is because non-partisans ministers constitute a 
political compromise between a president and his prime minister under a divided 
government. In this case, non-partisan ministers might strengthen a weaker prime 
minister (Neto and Strom 2006).  
To recap, the literature provides insights regarding the institutional factors that 
affect the appointment of technocrats and partisan ministers. Nonetheless we know very 
little with respect to the political motives of appointments of technocrats and even less of 
their policy effects.  	  
Ministerial appointments: dilemma between commitment, experience and expertise.  
Dowding and Dumont (2009) convincingly argue that prime ministers cannot 
freely appoint their friends, and when they have done so, they often failed to control the 
backbenchers having to face regular riots and opposition. Instead, prime ministers seem 
to select among friends and foes trying to keep balance of power within the party. In 
other words, while according to the principle agent theory ideological factions within the 
party should increase the appointment of experts, power-balancing considerations might 
force prime ministers to appoint their political and policy rivals.   
Revolt from party members, especially from the parliamentary group can 
sufficiently constrain the prime minister. Prime ministers’ policy preferences cannot be 
too different from their party, since they are elected by their party. This certainly explains 
the appointment of Venizelos- a party heavy-weight- as finance minister and the de-
selection of Papakonstantinou, a partisan, expert minister, by the Greek socialist prime 
minister in the midst of the debt crisis in Greece.  
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However, political parties are often divided into ideological factions. Prime 
ministers can have preferences that differ from a specific faction of the party. In the 
presence of ideological factions in the party, the appointment of a technocrat minister 
might be preferable by the prime minister’s faction, which does not want to bear the 
political cost of their preferred policy reform. For example, a policy expert might be the 
preferred choice of a Social-democrat prime minister or party leader who is in favor of 
reforms that another faction of the party dislikes. The prime minister or party leader 
might expect that this appointment will reduce internal party conflict.  
On the other hand, the prime minister or party leader wants to choose a minister 
who will be effective, who will be able to implement the reform. While technocrats are 
more likely to proceed with their policy mandate since they should be less sensitive to the 
political costs of their policy decisions, they might be ‘forced’ out of their job if the party 
turns against them. Given their lack in political skill and political clout within the party, 
they rely solely on the prime minister for their survival. In contrast, partisan ministers and 
especially those with political experience should be more successful in mobilizing the 
party base and in achieving party discipline.  
More generally, ministerial appointments are best described by the following 
dilemma between commitment and expertise versus experience. This is a dilemma 
between partisans, who are experienced but not necessarily committed to the prime 
minister’s policy agenda because of expected political costs, and might also lack policy 
expertise, and technocrats, who have policy expertise, are more committed to delivering a 
reform to the extent that they are directly appointed by the prime minister and have little 
political or personal cost but lack experience. In other words, in contrast to the literature, 
which questions the loyalty of non-partisan ministers, we question the commitment to 
policy reform of partisan ministers. This dilemma best summarized in the table below.  
	  
Table	  1 
 Partisan Technocrat 
Commitment ? √ 
Experience √ X 
Expertise X √ 
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Intra-party politics is likely to be a significant determinant of the prime minister’s 
decision to appoint partisan and technocrat ministers. The trade-off between commitment, 
expertise and experience is likely to be more acute when there are competing ideological 
factions in a party. The presence of ideological factions in a political party both increase 
the likelihood of appointing non-partisan expert ministers, or else technocrats, but at the 
same time, they also increase the likelihood of failure for the technocrat minister if the 
party faction mobilizes the party against the minister and his policy agenda. 
The shift in economic thought from Neo-Keynesian economics to Neo-Classical 
economics in the eighties, has meant that technocrats, especially those who come from 
the banking and finance sector are further to the right in their ideological placement than 
the average Social-democrat. For example, the OECD has been calling for labor-market 
liberalization and lower income tax for the last three decades (OECD 2010). Thus, it is 
expected that technocrat finance and labor ministers have been primarily appointed by 
prime ministers whose parties had a hard time implementing neoliberal reforms due to 
disagreement between different ideological factions in the party. In contrast, we do not 
expect to find that over time the appointment of technocrats has increased as substantially 
by conservative and liberal party leaders.  
 Political parties are often assumed unified actors for reasons of tractability and 
simplicity, even though they are often divided between factions (Benoit and Laver 2006). 
This is particularly true for social-democratic parties in the last thirty years, during which 
social-democratic parties had to respond to the economic consequences of de-
industrialization and globalization. The resignation of the German finance minister 
Lafontaine under the first Schroeder government is a good illustration of ideological rifts 
and disagreement within social-democratic parties. 
 Oskar Lafontaine was a traditional Social-democrat, positioned at the left of SPD, 
who was ideologically closer to the trade-unions on issues of labour market reform than 
to his prime-minister, Schroeder2. He clashed with Chancellor Schroeder and other 
cabinet ministers over economic policy and particularly over taxing more heavily the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “Left Party in Germany loses Leader and Driving Force”, NYT, January 2010.	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energy industry3. Trittin, the minister of Environment in the first Schroeder cabinet and 
member of the Green party, expressed publicly his desperation over Lafontaine’s 
resignation for losing a political ally in the Red-Green cabinet against the pro-business 
Schroeder4.  
 At the other end of the ideological spectrum within SPD stands Schroeder, one of 
the architects of ‘third-way’ social democracy. Schroeder has been attacked for his 
neoliberal policies regarding taxation and the labour market reforms known as Agenda 
2010. Schroeder’s interpretation of best practices for fighting unemployment were closer 
to the views of liberals and the business associations than those of the unions. He was the 
first Social-democrat prime minister to appoint a technocrat minister of economics with 
background in business and finance, Werner Muller. In his second cabinet he merged the 
ministries of economics and employment and appointed Wolfgang Clement -an elected 
SPD member but with strong neoliberal views who was later expelled by SPD and joined 
FDP- to head the ministry (Wiesendahl 2007). Schroeder’s and Clement’s reforms were 
highly unpopular within the Social-democratic party and eventually led to the withdrawal 
of Schroeder from the party chairmanship (Britanica Academic Edition: Germany, 2004).  
Similarly, although perhaps in a less dramatic way, the Dutch Christian Democrat 
prime minister, Balkenende appointed a technocrat in his cabinet for the post of the 
minister of social affairs and employment, Aart Jan de Geus. De Geus was neither a party 
member nor a member of parliament, and this is why he was selected for this job, 
according to him (personal interview, June 2011). He was explicitly asked by the prime 
minister to deliver reforms that were not favored by the “old generation of Christian 
democrats in the party”. He needed someone who had a background in the social 
partners- De Geus was the vice-president of the Christian trade union, CNV- and who 
would be determined to reform the disability system. According to De Geus the reason he 
succeeded in his reforms is because although his personal reputation was attacked by the 
unions, he ‘could understand that kind of pressure because he could understand the rules 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “Resignation rocks German Government”, BBC, March 1999.	  4	  “German Reds and Greens get the Blues”, NYT, March 1999.	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of the game’. In addition, he added that “if you start from outside there are no 
obligations, no open bills to other people. You start with a blank notebook”.  
These examples are illustrative of the potential role and the motives of the 
political appointment of technocrat ministers. Technocrat ministers who deal with 
economic and social policies are more likely to be appointed in the presence of intra-
party ideological conflict (H1). Unlike partisan ministers who fear the political and 
electoral costs of unpopular policies, technocrats bear no political or personal cost and 
are thus more likely to deliver policy reforms (H2).  	  
Who are the technocrats?  
In this paper technocrats are defined as ministers who, firstly, are not members of 
parliament during their ministerial appointment and secondly, have policy expertise. The 
primarily attribute of technocrats is the fact that they do not pursue a political career. 
They are professionals who are asked to join the cabinet to contribute to policy formation 
due to their policy expertise and do not seek election to the parliament. However, being 
an outside of the parliament member does not automatically qualify a minister as a 
technocrat. Ministers who are not members of parliament but are employed by a political 
party or are elected at the regional or local level cannot qualify as technocrats. The 
second dimension of technocrats is their policy expertise which they acquire through their 
professional career. To sum up, technocrats are defined as those professionals whose 
primary employment is outside politics and are appointed to deliver policies relevant to 
their policy expertise.  
Therefore, we define technocrats as those ministers who have never been elected 
members of parliament prior to their ministerial appointment. In addition, we identify a 
second type of technocrats, those ministers who are not elected members of parliament 
prior to their ministerial appointment, but became MPs later. The first category of 
technocrats, who were never members of the parliament nor were they party members, 
either before or after their ministerial appointment are defined as ‘strictly technocrat 
ministers’. The second category, who were not members of the parliament when they 
were first appointed but who were later elected in the parliament, are defined as ‘partisan 
technocrat ministers’. We make this distinction because we perceive partisanship and 
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technocracy as a continuum. A strictly technocrat minister is placed on the one end of the 
continuum, while a partisan minister is on the other end, with partisan technocrats 
occupying a middle ground between the two ends.  
Partisan technocrats are different from strict-technocrats in that they have or 
develop political ambitions to seek election in the parliament, which could compromise 
their commitment to policy reform. They are also different from partisan ministers to the 
extent that they bring in their policy expertise and professional background. We expect 
their appointment to be qualitatively different from the appointment of strict technocrats, 
who have no political ambitions and no connections to the political establishment. We 
expect strictly-technocrats to bear no political costs since they are appointed with a single 
policy mandate. On the other hand, partisan technocrats, who have political ambitions, 
are likely to be constrained by their political ambition and link to the party to the extent 
that their parliamentary career depends on their success in the cabinet. In turn their 
commitment to their policy mandate might be compromised.   
The technocrats we identify in this paper are outside of the parliament 
professionals whose primary profession is outside politics – they do not work for a 
political party or have not been elected at the local or regional level. In addition, we 
exclude technocrats who have been trade union officials because we assume they will 
have strong partisan links to social-democratic parties. By doing that, we assume that 
technocrats are, on average, to the right of social-democratic parties when it comes to 
economic and social reform. However, we do not explicitly code them on the basis of 
their profession, like Hallerberg and Wehner (2013) who code technocrats or rather 
‘technicians’ as they call them, politicians who have more specialized training or 
occupational experience irrespective of their political career. They operationalize 
technical competence as economic policy makers with PhD degrees in economics 
(specialized training) and as people with professional experience in economics5.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 They are only interested in economic-policy makers such as Prime Ministers/Presidents, 
Finance Ministers and Head of Central Banks. 
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Descriptive Analysis: the educational and professional background of technocrat 
ministers 
Our dataset includes a total of 2,010 ministerial appointments for the ministries of 
finance, labor and social affairs. 671 of these appointments are finance ministers, 659 are 
labor and 680 are social affairs ministers. The total number of technocratic appointments 
is 272 out of the total of 2,010. 179 of these are coded as strictly technocrat ministers and 
107 are coded as partisan technocrats. Table 2 gives the general distribution of 
technocrats across the countries in our dataset. Norway, Portugal and France have the 
most number of strictly technocrats. They are followed by Austria, Greece and Finland. 
While France, Austria and Greece have similar numbers of partisan technocrats, there is a 
dramatic decrease in the number of partisan technocrats when compared to strictly 
technocrats in Norway and Portugal. In total, France clearly is at the top of the 
technocrats list with 61. Norway, Portugal, Greece and Austria follow.  
 There is an important cross-country variation across Europe regarding the 
appointment of technocrat ministers. Relative lack of technocrats in Ireland and UK is 
worth mentioning. Lack of technocrats in Ireland is due to its constitutional provisions 
that require the cabinet members to be selected from those who have been elected to the 
parliament. Although there is no such provision in UK, relative lack of technocrats can be 
explained by the specific pathway to ministerial power in this country. It is the general 
trend in the UK that the members of the executive are chosen exclusively from the 
legislature, mainly from the elected MPs or to a lesser extent from the House of Lords. 
One exception to this general trend has been the technocratic appointments by Gordon 
Brown in 20076. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
   Table 3 captures the overall trend of the technocratic ministerial appointments. 
Clearly, there is a gradual increase in the number of all technocratic appointments over 
time until the 2000s, although the increase is steeper for strictly technocrats.  
[Table 3 about here] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As a result Ireland is excluded from the sample of countries use for the statistical 
analysis. 
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In terms of the party families, Social Democrats have the highest number of 
strictly technocrat appointments, followed by Conservatives and Christian Democrats. 
Liberals and Communists have considerably lower number of strictly technocratic 
appointments. Regarding partisan technocratic appointments, Social Democrats again 
lead but now the Liberals follow, leaving Conservatives and Christian Democrats behind 
them.  
With respect to the education level of technocrats, nearly half of the strictly 
technocrats have a Phd degree while the other half have either a college or a graduate 
degree. For partisan technocrats, the number of ministers with PhD degrees falls to 1/3 of 
the total. The majority of partisan technocrats have a graduate degree followed by 
ministers with a college degree. In terms of their training, 72 of the strictly technocrats 
have training in economics/business, 43 of them have training in law, 15 of them have 
training in medicine and 14 of them have military training. There are a few strictly 
technocrats with training in engineering (9) and natural sciences (2).  For partisan 
technocrats, there is a different picture. While there are 46 ministers with 
economics/business training (nearly half of the total), there are 23 with social sciences 
and 21 with natural sciences training. While there are 6 ministers with military training, 
there is one engineer and no minister with medical background.   
  Finally, with respect to their occupational background, there are 33 professors, 28 
lawyers, 20 civil servants, 15 medical doctors, 14 economists, 13 with finance/banking 
background and 13 executives for the strictly technocrats. For the partisans, 30 of them 
are civil servants (nearly 1/3 of them) and 21 of them are professors.  Other notable 
occupations are lawyers (9), economists (7) and doctors (6).   
  
Technocrat Ministers of Finance 
There are 673 ministerial appointments for the ministry of finance in the 14 
European countries in our dataset.  While 89 of these finance ministers are strictly 
technocrats, 56 of these ministers are partisan technocrats. France is at the top of the list 
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for both strictly (19) and partisan technocrats (12)7. Austria respectively has 16 and 11. 
While Portugal has 19 strict technocrats of finance, she has only 3 partisans. The UK and 
Ireland do not have any technocrat finance ministers. The complete list can found in 
Table 4.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The distribution of finance technocrat ministers over time is quite different for 
strictly and partisan technocrats.  The increase in strictly technocrats has been rather 
dramatic in the nineties and two-thousands and has significantly exceeded the numbers of 
partisan technocrats.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The distribution of strictly finance technocrats across party families is rather even 
with Social Democrats having 23, Christian Democrats, 18 and Conservatives 16. 
Interestingly, only 6 strictly technocrat finance ministers have been appointed by 
Liberals. In contrast, the vast majority of partisan technocrat finance ministers have been 
appointed by Social Democrats (29) while all Christian Democrats, Liberals, and 
Conservatives have appointed 7 or fewer.  
Nearly 60% of the strictly technocrats have PhD degrees and the rest have either 
graduate or undergraduate degrees. In contrast, only 35% of the partisans have PhD 
degrees and 30% of them have a graduate degree. In terms of their training, the majority 
of the strictly technocrat ministers of finance have training in either economics/business 
(67%) or finance/banking (24%). There are only a few ministers with training in social 
sciences and engineering.  For the partisans, 55% of them have economics/business, 15% 
of them have finance/banking and 21% of them have training in social sciences.  
Lastly, regarding the professional background of strictly technocrat ministers the 
main categories: professors (26%), economists (16%), bankers (15%), civil servants 
(12%) and lawyers (11%). There are also a few executives, full time employee 
organization directors, journalists and policy advisors. For the partisans, the main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This is largely explained by the semi-presidential political regime in France (see Neto 
and Strom 2006). 
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categories are: Professors (27%), civil servants (23%) and economists (13%). There are 
also a few executives, lawyers and people with background in supranational institutions.  
 
Empirical Analysis: Data and Statistical Models 	  
The hypotheses are tested using a novel dataset, which codes ministers’ political, 
and professional background as well as the party families of the prime ministers that 
appointed in office. One minister is assigned in each cabinet as the minister of finance, 
labour and social affairs. Reshuffles have been coded to the extent that the information is 
in the public domain. Junior ministers are not coded. 
The dataset includes a sample of thirteen European countries, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK8. These are all parliamentary democracies, with the exception of France, which is 
semi-presidential. The dataset spans from 1945 for all the countries but Finland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, for which observations start in the seventies, and runs until 2010. 
As already discussed, technocrats are defined as ministers who were never elected 
in the parliament –strictly technocrats- or ministers who were not elected in the 
parliament before their appointment but were elected later – partisan technocrats. To 
make sure that these ministers had no career in other levels of government, we excluded 
all technocrats who had a political career in the local or regional government or who had 
worked for a political party. In addition, we excluded all the technocrats who had been 
trade-union officials. The main reason for excluding former trade unionists is that we 
assume technocrats are placed to the right of social democratic parties due mostly due to 
their training and professional career. In the regressions, we test the hypotheses using 
both definitions of technocrats.  
In addition, we test our two hypotheses using two other measures of policy 
expertise. This is a measure of expertise for both strictly technocrats and partisans. 
Experts are coded as those ministers who were economists, professors, bankers, 
executives, lawyers or civil servants.  
To remind the reader, the first hypothesis states that technocrats are more likely to 
be appointed during periods of intra-party conflict. To test this hypothesis, we regress 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ireland has been excluded since it does not have any technocrats 
	   16	  
technocrats on social democratic parties before and after critical time periods, namely 
before and after the mid-eighties when neoliberal economics became more dominant 
within the economics profession, and before and after the 2008 banking crisis. The 
second hypothesis states that technocrats and especially strictly technocrats are expected 
to be able to implement more unpopular reform than partisans. To test this hypothesis, we 
test the impact of technocrats and expert partisan finance ministers on four policy 
outcomes: changes in debt, unemployment, growth and social spending.  
The dependent variables for Hypothesis 1 are: strictly technocrat ministers of 
finance, labour or social affairs, partisan ministers of finance, labour or social affairs, 
strictly expert technocrat ministers of finance, labour or social affairs or expert partisan 
ministers of finance, labour or social affairs.  
The main explanatory variables for Hypothesis 1 are Social Democratic party and 
critical historical junctures in the global economy, namely the time after 1985 and the 
banking and financial crisis of 2008.  
We concentrate on social democratic parties is because we expect ideological 
disagreement between party factions to be the largest within social democrats than within 
any other party family. 1985 is assumed to be a breakpoint after which neoliberal ideas 
have consolidated in the economics profession and which caused the increase in 
ideological disagreement within Social-democratic parties. We expect that after 1985 
technocratic appointments increased dramatically for Social democrats, mostly due to 
disagreements in policy within party factions. Similarly, the 2008 banking and financial 
crisis are expected to have been a catalyst for appointing more technocrat ministers. We 
also include the control variables, market economy, which measures the political saliency 
of market oriented policy reforms, based on the manifesto data project and multiparty 
government which has been previously used in the literature as an explanatory variable 
for technocratic appointments (Neto and Strom 2006). 
Hypothesis 2 tests the policy impact of technocrat finance ministers on four policy 
outcomes: debt, economic growth, unemployment and social spending. All of the 
economic variables come from the Comparative Political Data Set 2010 that includes 
variables from a wide range of sources. These economic variables except the social 
spending rely on the OECD Economic Outlooks Database. Debt measures the gross 
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government debt (financial liabilities) as a percentage of GDP. Economic growth 
measures the growth of GDP (percentage changes from previous year). Unemployment 
measures the unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force. Lastly, social 
spending measures the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP and comes from the OECD Social Expenditure Statistics. The main 
explanatory variables are strictly finance technocrat ministers and social democrat 
strictly finance ministers, partisan finance technocrat ministers and social democrat 
partisan finance ministers, and expert partisan finance ministers and social democrat 
expert partisan finance ministers.  
There are also economic control variables in the models. Openness of the 
economy, which is measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of 
GDP (in current prices) is taken from the Comparative Political Data Set 2010 and comes 
from Penn World Tables. Social transfers variable, which is measured as the social 
security transfers as a percentage of GDP, is taken from the Comparative Political Data 
Set 2010 and comes from the OECD National Accounts Statistics. Lastly, all the models 
include a dummy for France in order to control for the effect of its semi-presidential 
regime on technocratic appointments. 	   Hypothesis 1 is tested using a logit model with standard robust errors clustered by 
country, while Hypothesis 2 is tested using OLS regression with country dummies and 
robust standard errors. The dependent variables in all policy equations are in changes 
instead of levels due to the trend the variables exhibit.  
 
Discussion 
Tables 6 through to 0 provide the results of the multivariate analysis.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Our first hypothesis states that technocrats are more likely to be appointed in the 
presence of intra-party ideological conflict. We expect the ideological conflict to be the 
most severe for Social Democratic parties. Tables 6 and 7 test the first hypothesis and 
provide the results for appointments over time and under different economic conditions. 
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The results support our expectations, although they also reveal some interesting variation 
between expert technocrats and expert partisans. Overall, Social Democratic parties are 
less likely to appoint partisan experts than non-Social Democratic parties. This is 
particularly clear in Table 7 which reports the simple, non-interactive models and which 
controls for macroeconomic conditions, such as debt, unemployment and economic 
growth. However, Social Democrats have a positive and significant effect on expert 
partisan appointments after 1985. Nonetheless, even with this effect, the overall 
interactive effect of Social Democratic parties on expert partisans remains negative and 
statistically significant9. Moreover, Social Democratic prime ministers seem to prefer 
technocrats and especially strictly technocrats over partisan experts when faced with a 
major banking and financial crisis like the current one. This finding is inline with our 
expectations: in the face of major economic adjustments, prime ministers prefer outside 
of the parliament experts over partisans, who would bear a too high cost for economic 
adjustment. Against our expectations, the appointments of technocrats by Social 
Democrats did not increase after 1985. 
More specifically, according to Table 6, the interaction between Social Democrats 
and the banking crisis is positive and significant for both strictly technocrats and strictly 
expert technocrats. Social democrat prime ministers are more likely to appoint strictly 
and expert technocrat ministers during periods of financial crisis. However, and against 
our expectations, the interactive term of Social Democrats with the period after 1985 is 
not positive and statistically significant. Lastly, Table 7 reports the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on technocratic appointments. Economic conditions in 
general do not play a robustly significant role in predicting technocratic appointments. 
The combined results of Tables 6 and 7 reveal that although Social Democrats seem to 
prefer expert technocrats over expert partisans, this results is conditional on the presence 
of the banking crisis.  
 Tables 8 through to 10 test our arguments about the policy effectiveness of strictly 
technocrats, partisan technocrats and expert partisan ministers, respectively. Controlling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The conditional effect of social democracy and the 1985 break on expert partisans is -
.61, with a z of -1.93 
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for underlying economic conditions, strictly technocrat finance ministers result in 
significant reduction in GDP growth levels, have no significant effect on changes on debt 
levels and decrease the level of social spending. These first and preliminary statistical 
results provide support to our hypothesis and indicate that technocrat ministers, free from 
political agendas and party pressures, are more capable of adopting unpopular policies, 
such as decreasing social spending. This further supports the argument that they are 
appointed to deliver results in controversial policy reforms such as social spending. 
Another important finding in Table 8 is the different policy effects of strictly technocrats 
vis a vis Social Democratic strictly technocrats. Social Democrat technocrats are only 
associated with lower social spending but not with lower economic growth, which clearly 
indicates that they are appointed specifically to go against the party’s traditional agenda. 
In contrast, non-Social Democrat technocrats have a strong and negative effect on 
economic growth. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 	  
 
 The effect of Social Democrat strictly technocrats on social spending becomes 
even stronger by the results reported in Table 9. Table 9 provides the policy effect of 
partisan technocrats. While non-socialists partisan technocrats of finance result in 
significant reduction in social spending, Social democrat partisan technocrats result in 
significant increase in social spending. There is no significant relationship between 
partisan technocrats and debt, GDP growth and unemployment levels.  	   Lastly, the importance of out of parliament ministers on social spending is further 
supported by the results in Table 10, which reports the policy effects of expert partisan 
ministers. Social Democrat expert partisans have no effect on any policy and they have a 
positive, although not statistically significant effect on social spending. The only policy 
effect in Table 10 is that non-socialists expert finance partisan ministers have a 
significantly positive effect on the GDP growth levels.  
[Table 10 about here] 
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 To recap, our preliminary empirical results show that technocrat ministers of 
finance are associated with lower debt, lower economic growth, and lower social 
spending, although their partisan affiliation is also an important predictor.  
 
Conclusion 
Do technocrat ministers matter for policy? Why and when do prime ministers 
appoint technocrats instead of partisan ministers who handle social and economic policy? 
This paper is a first attempt to answer these important for policy and political 
representation questions. By using a novel dataset that codes the political and 
professional experience of ministers of finance, labour and social affairs, we test two 
hypotheses regarding technocratic appointments and their policy effects. We find support 
for both hypotheses. Differentiating between strictly technocrats, partisan technocrats and 
expert partisans, we find that strictly technocrats have the largest policy effect on policy. 
However, these effects are conditional on partisanship: Social Democrat technocrats have 
policy effects on social policy but not on growth or unemployment. In addition, we find 
that the distinction between strictly and partisan technocrats is crucial, as only strictly 
Social Democratic technocrats have the expected negative effect on social spending. 
Regarding technocratic appointments we find that the current financial and banking crisis 
is the most significant predictor of strictly technocratic appointments but only for Social 
Democratic parties. This finding confirms our prediction that technocratic appointments 
are particularly controversial for Social Democrats and it takes a large economic crisis for 
their appointments to be justified.  
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Table	  2:	  Distribution	  of	  Technocrat	  Ministers10	  Across	  14	  European	  countries	  
	  
 
Strictly 
Technocrats 
Partisan 
Technocrats 
All 
technocrats 
    Austria 16 12 28 
Denmark 3 9 11 
Finland 14 2 12 
France 31 30 61 
Germany 1 4 5 
Greece 16 13 29 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 10 8 13 
Netherlands 5 6 11 
Norway 36 8 41 
Portugal 37 5 42 
Spain 4 6 10 
Sweden 5 4 8 
United 
Kingdom 1 0 1 
    Total 179 107 272 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 To remind the reader, these technocratic appointments refer only to the ministries of 
finance, labour and social affairs.  
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Table	  3:	  Distribution	  of	  Technocrats	  Over	  Time	  
	  
 fifties sixties seventies eighties nineties Two-
thousands 
Strictly Technocrats 19 18 41 46 50 39 
Partisan Technocrats 6 16 24 27 32 10 
All Technocrats 25 33 64 65 78 45 
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Table	  4:	  Distribution	  of	  Technocratic	  Finance	  Ministers	  in	  
14	  European	  Countries	  	  	  
 
Strict 
Techs. 
Partisan 
Techs 
All 
Techs. 
Austria 16 11 27 
Denmark 1 2 2 
Finland 4 2 5 
France 19 12 31 
Germany 1 3 4 
Greece 5 7 12 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 9 6 10 
Netherlands 1 5 6 
Norway 8 1 9 
Portugal 19 3 22 
Spain 1 2 3 
Sweden 5 2 6 
United 
Kingdom 0 0 0 
    Total 89 56 137 
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Table	  5:	  Distribution	  of	  Technocrat	  Ministers	  of	  Finance	  Over	  Time	  
 
fifties sixties seventies eighties nineties thousands 
       Strictly 12 11 12 19 33 24 
Partisan 5 8 14 15 12 3 
All 17 19 25 30 42 24 
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Table	  6:	  Predicting	  Technocratic	  Appointments	  over	  Time	  
	  
(1)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  
Dep.	  Variables	  
Strictly	  
technocrats	  
Partisan	  
technocrats	  	  
Expert	  
technocrats	  
Expert	  
partisans	  
	   	   	   	   	  Multiparty	   0.0285	   0.0689	   0.5471	   -­‐0.2537	  
	  
(0.5335)	   (0.5442)	   (0.4341)	   (0.3275)	  
Social	  Democratic	  
Party	   0.0638	   0.2778	   0.1864	   -­‐0.9638***	  
	  
(0.4525)	   (0.5506)	   (0.5010)	   (0.2223)	  
Market	  Economy	   0.0439	   -­‐0.0113	   0.0535	   -­‐0.0386	  
	  
(0.0350)	   (0.0214)	   (0.0349)	   (0.0276)	  
Break-­‐1985	   -­‐0.6391	   -­‐0.6078	   -­‐0.3984	   -­‐0.0659	  
	  
(0.4499)	   (0.4354)	   (0.5723)	   (0.2511)	  
Banking	  Crisis	   -­‐0.1170	   0.2123	   -­‐0.7064	   -­‐0.8610*	  
	  
(0.6949)	   (0.6570)	   (1.0109)	   (0.5055)	  
Social	  Democracy*	  
Break-­‐1985	   -­‐0.4591	   0.7408	   -­‐0.8627	   0.4738*	  
	  
(0.6234)	   (0.6910)	   (0.8300)	   (0.2836)	  
Social	  Democracy	  
*Crisis	   2.2721**	   -­‐0.4004	   2.8558*	   0.6137	  
	  
(1.0872)	   (1.2922)	   (1.5097)	   (0.7045)	  
France	   0.4807	   1.8545***	   0.8936*	   -­‐0.7439***	  
	  
(0.4374)	   (0.3034)	   (0.4635)	   (0.2402)	  
Constant	   -­‐2.4464***	   -­‐3.0632***	   -­‐3.4525***	   0.4868*	  
	  
(0.5483)	   (0.6139)	   (0.4692)	   (0.2658)	  
Observations	   1551	   1551	   1551	   1551	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	   	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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Table	  7:	  Predicting	  Technocratic	  Appointments	  under	  different	  economic	  conditions	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Dep.	  Variables	  
Strictly	  
technocrats	  
Partisan	  
technocrats	  	  
Expert	  
technocrats	  
Expert	  
partisans	  
	   	   	   	   	  Multiparty	   -­‐0.1319	   0.6871	   0.1855	   -­‐0.4572	  
	  
(0.5123)	   (0.5215)	   (0.7458)	   (0.3132)	  
Social	  Democratic	  
Party	   -­‐0.2433	   0.0024	   0.8630**	   -­‐0.8103***	  
	  
(0.4303)	   (0.5844)	   (0.4136)	   (0.1892)	  
Market	  Economy	   -­‐0.0304	   -­‐0.0206	   -­‐0.0133	   -­‐0.0359	  
	  
(0.0511)	   (0.0550)	   (0.0279)	   (0.0317)	  
Break-­‐1985	   -­‐0.3967	   -­‐0.6320	   -­‐0.2410	   -­‐0.1305	  
	  
(0.4030)	   (0.5440)	   (0.3360)	   (0.3170)	  
Banking	  Crisis	   0.3095	   0.0000	   0.8599	   -­‐0.6425	  
	  
(1.0751)	   (0.0000)	   (0.5803)	   (0.5551)	  
France	   0.6589**	   1.1659***	   2.1575***	   -­‐0.5115**	  
	  
(0.2857)	   (0.3105)	   (0.2576)	   (0.2237)	  
Debt	   -­‐0.0154**	   -­‐0.0014	   0.0077	   0.0043	  
	  
(0.0068)	   (0.0086)	   (0.0075)	   (0.0070)	  
Unemployment	   -­‐0.0595	   -­‐0.0627	   -­‐0.1067*	   0.0461	  
	  
(0.0854)	   (0.0879)	   (0.0586)	   (0.0631)	  
GDP	  Growth	   -­‐0.0479	   -­‐0.0504	   -­‐0.1703***	   0.0087	  
	  
(0.0486)	   (0.0822)	   (0.0478)	   (0.0320)	  
Constant	   -­‐1.0438	   -­‐2.8446**	   -­‐2.7057***	   0.1600	  
	  
(0.7910)	   (1.1425)	   (0.5589)	   (0.4149)	  
Observations	   1002	   987	   1002	   1002	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	   	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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Table	  8:	  The	  policy	  effects	  of	  Strictly	  Technocrats	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Dep.	  Variables	   D.	  Debt	  
D.	  GDP	  
Growth	  
D.	  
Unemployment	  
D.	  Social	  
Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	  Social	  Democrat-­‐	  
Finance	   -­‐0.2936	   -­‐0.0220	   0.0028	   0.1134	  
	  
(0.4607)	   (0.0741)	   (0.0551)	   (0.0923)	  
Strict	  Technocrats	  
Finance	   -­‐0.0356	   -­‐0.6235***	   -­‐0.0067	   0.0662	  
	  
(0.8355)	   (0.1229)	   (0.0487)	   (0.0864)	  
SD.	  Strict	  
Technocrats	  	   -­‐1.1726	   0.4295	   0.1329	   -­‐0.6242**	  
	  
(1.1455)	   (0.4339)	   (0.2120)	   (0.2512)	  
Multiparty	   1.6265	   -­‐0.6397*	   -­‐0.3258**	   -­‐0.1093	  
	  
(1.4341)	   (0.2981)	   (0.1242)	   (0.2483)	  
Economic	  Growth	   -­‐0.2139	   -­‐0.9610***	   -­‐0.1895***	   -­‐0.0692	  
	  
(0.1614)	   (0.0665)	   (0.0401)	   (0.0610)	  
Trade	  Openness	   0.0508**	   -­‐0.0715***	   -­‐0.0134**	   -­‐0.0094	  
	  
(0.0211)	   (0.0160)	   (0.0047)	   (0.0087)	  
D.	  Social	  Transfers	   0.3674	   -­‐0.6202**	   0.2137**	  
	  
	  
(0.2905)	   (0.2567)	   (0.0974)	  
	  D.	  Unemployment	   1.6254***	   -­‐0.9540***	  
	   	  
	  
(0.2183)	   (0.1918)	  
	   	  Debt	   -­‐0.0494***	  
	   	   	  
	  
(0.0083)	  
	   	   	  D.	  Debt	  
	  
-­‐0.0496**	   0.0627**	   0.0468**	  
	   	  
(0.0209)	   (0.0221)	   (0.0192)	  
Unemployment	  
	   	  
-­‐0.0743***	  
	  
	   	   	  
(0.0204)	  
	  Social	  Spending	  	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.1205***	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0177)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.3011	   8.1965***	   2.0177***	   4.4494***	  
	  
(1.6919)	   (1.2807)	   (0.4405)	   (0.9570)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   2331	   2263	   2331	   1562	  
R-­‐squared	   0.287	   0.615	   0.478	   0.271	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	   	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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Table	  9:	  The	  policy	  effects	  of	  Partisan	  Technocrats	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Dep.	  Variables	   D.	  Debt	  
D.	  GDP	  
Growth	  
D.	  
Unemployment	  
D.	  Social	  
Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	  Social	  Democrat	  
Finance	   -­‐0.4658	   0.0294	   0.0135	   0.0479	  
	  
(0.4221)	   (0.0753)	   (0.0591)	   (0.1090)	  
Partisan	  Technocrats	  
Finance	   0.1660	   0.4396	   0.0448	   -­‐0.4238**	  
	  
(1.7397)	   (0.6750)	   (0.1926)	   (0.1705)	  
SD.	  Partisan	  
Technocrats	  	   0.6586	   -­‐0.9103	   -­‐0.0665	   0.6439**	  
	  
(2.0586)	   (0.7892)	   (0.1697)	   (0.2905)	  
Multiparty	   1.6260	   -­‐0.6586**	   -­‐0.3260**	   -­‐0.1151	  
	  
(1.4316)	   (0.2966)	   (0.1240)	   (0.2405)	  
Economic	  Growth	   -­‐0.2113	   -­‐0.9601***	   -­‐0.1896***	   -­‐0.0678	  
	  
(0.1602)	   (0.0657)	   (0.0398)	   (0.0605)	  
Trade	  Openness	   0.0506**	   -­‐0.0718***	   -­‐0.0134**	   -­‐0.0094	  
	  
(0.0211)	   (0.0160)	   (0.0047)	   (0.0088)	  
D.	  Social	  Transfers	   0.3680	   -­‐0.6176**	   0.2140**	  
	  
	  
(0.2922)	   (0.2573)	   (0.0967)	  
	  D.	  Unemployment	   1.6247***	   -­‐0.9550***	  
	   	  
	  
(0.2175)	   (0.1920)	  
	   	  Debt	   -­‐0.0492***	  
	   	   	  
	  
(0.0083)	  
	   	   	  D.	  Debt	  
	  
-­‐0.0492**	   0.0626**	   0.0469**	  
	   	  
(0.0211)	   (0.0221)	   (0.0192)	  
Unemployment	  
	   	  
-­‐0.0743***	  
	  
	   	   	  
(0.0202)	  
	  Social	  Spending	  	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.1180***	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0175)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.3486	   8.2454***	   2.0170***	   4.3752***	  
	  
(1.6841)	   (1.2922)	   (0.4425)	   (0.9718)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   2331	   2263	   2331	   1562	  
R-­‐squared	   0.287	   0.614	   0.478	   0.270	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	   	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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Table	  10:	  The	  policy	  effects	  of	  expert	  partisans	  
Dep.	  Variables	   D.	  Debt	  
D.	  GDP	  
Growth	  
D.	  
Unemployment	  
D.	  Social	  
Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	  Left	  Finance	   -­‐0.3469	   -­‐0.1641	   -­‐0.0612	   0.0099	  
	  
(0.2163)	   (0.1243)	   (0.0572)	   (0.0688)	  
Expert	  Partisan	  
Finance	   0.4961	   0.2235*	   -­‐0.0808	   -­‐0.0558	  
	  
(0.6392)	   (0.1040)	   (0.0820)	   (0.1124)	  
Left	  Expert	  Partisan	  
Finance	   -­‐0.4960	   0.0731	   0.1684	   0.1727	  
	  
(1.4805)	   (0.2265)	   (0.1679)	   (0.1903)	  
Multiparty	   1.6111	   -­‐0.6679**	   -­‐0.2383**	   -­‐0.1148	  
	  
(1.4238)	   (0.2947)	   (0.1017)	   (0.2516)	  
Economic	  Growth	   -­‐0.2122	   -­‐0.9602***	   -­‐0.2177***	   -­‐0.0684	  
	  
(0.1605)	   (0.0667)	   (0.0566)	   (0.0611)	  
Trade	  Openness	   0.0504**	   -­‐0.0718***	   -­‐0.0129**	   -­‐0.0092	  
	  
(0.0211)	   (0.0160)	   (0.0044)	   (0.0088)	  
D.	  Social	  Transfers	   0.3671	   -­‐0.6205**	   0.2856**	  
	  
	  
(0.2878)	   (0.2571)	   (0.1247)	  
	  D.	  Unemployment	   1.6277***	   -­‐0.9542***	  
	   	  
	  
(0.2183)	   (0.1922)	  
	   	  Debt	   -­‐0.0491***	  
	  
-­‐0.0035	  
	  
	  
(0.0082)	  
	  
(0.0034)	  
	  D.	  Debt	  
	  
-­‐0.0500**	  
	  
0.0470**	  
	   	  
(0.0210)	  
	  
(0.0192)	  
Unemployment	  
	   	  
-­‐0.0559***	  
	  
	   	   	  
(0.0122)	  
	  Social	  Spending	  	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.1191***	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0176)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.2826	   8.2303***	   2.2232***	   4.3977***	  
	  
(1.6956)	   (1.2809)	   (0.4743)	   (0.9508)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   2331	   2263	   2331	   1562	  
R-­‐squared	   0.287	   0.615	   0.409	   0.270	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	   	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  
	   	   	  	  
